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Abstract
Economic analysis of rank-order tournaments has shown that intensi ied competition leads to declining perfor-
mance. Empirical research demonstrates that individuals in tournament-type contests perform less well on average
in the presence of larger number of competitors in total and superstars. Particularly in  ield settings, studies often lack
direct evidence about the underlying mechanisms, such as the amount of effort, that might account for these results.
Here we exploit a novel dataset on algorithmic programming contests that contains data on individual effort, risk tak-
ing, and cognitive errors that may underlie tournament performance outcomes. We  ind that competitors on average
react negatively to an increase in the total number of competitors, and react more negatively to an increase in the num-
ber of superstars than non-superstars. We also  ind that the most negative reactions come from a particular subgroup
of competitors: those that are highly skilled, but whose abilities put them near to the top of the ability distribution.
For these competitors, we  ind no evidence that the decline in performance outcomes stems from reduced effort or in-
creased risk taking. Instead, errors in logic lead to a decline in performance, which suggests a cognitive explanation for
the negative response to increased competition. We also  ind that a small group of competitors, who are at the very top
oftheabilitydistribution(non-superstars),reactpositivelytoincreasedcompetitionfromsuperstars. Forthem,we ind
some evidence of increased effort and no increase in errors of logic, consistent with both economic and psychological
explanations.
JEL Codes: D03
*Jack Hughes, Robert Hughes, Ira Heffan, and Mike Lydon from TopCoder generously provided their time and assistance with this paper. Seminar
participantsatDukeUniversityandHarvardBusinessSchoolprovidedfeedbackonthispaper. TheHarvard-NASATournamentLaboratorysupported
this work. All mistakes remain our own.
11 Introduction
Rank-order tournaments and contests have attracted great interest since the seminal work of Lazear and Rosen
(1981) on optimal labor contracts. Tournament theory has been applied to a range of diverse activities, includ-
ing academic achievement, amateur and professional sports, arts, architecture, manual labor, sales, engineering
and scienti ic work, and executive promotion.1 Prize-based contests have also been studied as a means to spur
innovation(Wright,1983;Kremer,1998;Scotchmer,2004;TerwieschandXu,2008;KremerandWilliams,2010).
These types of contests played an important historical role in driving technological development in a range of
industries including agriculture (Brunt, Lerner, and Nicholas, 2011). More recently, large-scale online contest
platforms that provide on-going tournament-based work and compensation have emerged in areas such as sci-
enti ic problem-solving, software development, graphic arts design and creative performance, as anticipated by
Autor (2001). Today large industrial companies increasingly use online contests as a complement to in-house
research and development.
Theories of behavior and performance in rank-order tournaments have analyzed the provision of economic
incentives,aswellasstrategicresponsesonthepartofparticipantswhencontestsareusedtoeliciteffort(Lazear
and Rosen, 1981; Taylor, 1995; Prendergast, 1999; Moldovanu and Sela, 2001). One issue in the design of tour-
naments concerns the effect of the number and skill distribution of competitors on the elicitation of effort and
performance outcomes. Empirical research on tournaments has shown that individuals perform less well on av-
erage when faced with a larger number of competitors in total and a larger number of superstars. This evidence
has come primarily from experimental settings and sporting events. Particularly in  ield settings, studies often
lack direct evidence about the underlying mechanisms, such as the amount of effort, that might account for these
results. In this study, we exploit a novel dataset on algorithmic programming contests that contains data on indi-
vidual effort, risk taking, and cognitive errors, enabling us to shed greater light on the mechanisms that underlie
performance outcomes in the face of increased competition.
As a simple example of a one-shot tournament, consider amateur golfers playing a round. Players with similar
handicaps, i.e., of equal ability, might prefer to play in a twosome rather than a foursome, because the probability
of out-playing a single competitor exceeds that of out-playing three rivals. Additionally, each golfer may exert
less effort and therefore perform less well in the foursome, because the lower likelihood of winning reduces the
returnstoeffort. Empiricalstudiesoftournament-typecontestshaveshownthat,onaverage,individualsperform
less well when faced with a larger number of competitors, including in retail sales (Casas-Arce and Martı́nez-
Jerez, 2009), research tournaments (Fullerton et al., 2002), and software development (Boudreau, Lacetera, and
Lakhani, 2011).
Earlymodelsoftournamentsreliedontheassumptionthatagentshadequalability(LazearandRosen,1981).
Subsequent theoretical analysis and empirical research has examined tournaments in which competitors have
heterogeneous abilities (Knoeber and Thurman, 1994), including recent work on the effect of completely domi-
nantcompetitors(Brown,2011).2 Continuingwiththegolfanalogy,supposethatTigerWoodsreplacesoneofthe
members of the foursome-an extreme form of varying the ability of competitors. On his worst day, Tiger Woods
will outplay each of the other golfers. In this extreme case, a superstar competitor performs better with zero ef-
fort than another competitor performs with maximum effort; the expected rank of performance for each player
therefore drops with virtual certainty relative to contests without such a superstar. If contest payoffs are winner-
take-all or strongly non-linear with respect to rank, non-superstars have little incentive to exert effort. Evidence
of a ``superstar effect'', in which non-superstars perform less well in the presence of a much superior player, has
been found in competitive sporting environments such as tennis (Sunde, 2003; Lallemand, Plasman, and Rycx,
2008), and indeed in the case of professional golf in the US (Brown, 2011) and Japan (Tanaka and Ishino, 2012).3
1Konrad (2009) provides a comprehensive literature review in a range of contest and tournament settings.
2Szymanski and Valletti (2005) consider the implications of tournaments with unequal ability distributions. Brown (2011) provides a simple
formal model of the effects of incentives and strategies created by the presence of a superstar in a professional sports setting.
3Competitive rank order tournaments may have other disadvantages. Relative to more conventional contracting with a single agent and rewards
based on observable outcomes (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991), tournaments create redundant costs and efforts by multiple agents on the same
task (Che and Gale, 1983; Fullerton and McAfee, 1999). However, by enabling comparisons through relative performance evaluation, tournaments
have the advantage of generating more information regarding things such as the dif iculty of the task and the relative skills or efforts of workers in
the tournament. And, adding at least a minimum level of competition can stimulate effort by discouraging slack (Taylor, 1995). A large number and
2Priorresearchhasoftenattributedthesuperstareffecttoarationaldecreaseineffortbynon-superstars. Butin
addition,asuperstarmightaffectthebehaviorandperformanceofcompetitorsthroughotherchannels. Consider
this quote from Riley (2012):
``There were a number of years, enough to be called an unmatchable era, when Tiger [Woods] won
every single tournament in which he held a third-round lead. Part of this dominance was aided by
the thumb-sucking meltdowns of his playing partners; when paired with Tiger, opponents put up no-
tablyworsescoresthantheydidwithanyoneelse. Andtheseweregreatplayers, major-championship
contenders. In the past, guys like Robert Rock would stub themselves right out of contention, their
intestines were knotted so tightly.
This passage provides a complementary view of the behavioral mechanisms set in motion by intensi ied com-
petition and the associated impact on performance. Riley interprets the reaction of other players to Tiger Woods
as a form of ``choking,'' in which psychological pressure, in this case from the presence of a dominant competitor,
causes other golfers to perform below their abilities. Research in psychology has established that stress or pres-
sure on individuals to perform well--including time pressure to perform a task, high stakes, the presence of an
audience, and social anxiety--causes individuals to perform below their abilities (Baumeister and Showers, 1986;
DeCaro et al., 2011).4
Psychological response to competition may take other forms as well. For example, tournament incentives may
leadindividualstolowertheir``cognitiveeffort''--alsoknownasmentaleffort,denotingintensityofmentalactivity
including the degree of voluntary attention or concentration (Kahneman, 1973)--which contrasts with physical
or ``labor effort'' (Bracha and Fershtman, 2012). For example, in an experimental study, Bracha and Fershtman
(2012)  ind that some individuals may work harder in terms of labor effort in a tournament-type contest than
under a pay-for-performance reward structure, but cognitive effort may deteriorate, causing worse performance
outcomes.
Yet other research has suggested that the psychological response to pressure may cause the performance of
some competitors to improve rather than decline, particularly for high-ability individuals. In particular, self-
con idenceinthetaskathand,whichmaybepositivelycorrelatedwithability,cancounterbalancethedebilitating
effects of stress in some circumstances (Baumeister and Showers, 1986). In an experimental study involving bas-
ketball free throws, Otten (2009)  inds that greater ``perceived control'' (self-con idence) has a positive affect on
performance under pressure, suggesting a possible explanation for ``clutch'' (better than usual) performance.
In addition to the foregoing explanations of reactions to increased competition, both economic and psycho-
logical research suggests that the ability of competitors may affect their reactions. For example, economic logic
suggests that lower skilled competitors may react less negatively to the presence of a superstar, because a super-
starhaslessimpactonthelikelyrankofthesecompetitors(Brown,2011). Incontrast,highabilitycompetitorson
the edge of winning positions may even increase their effort, because they have the most to gain (Casas-Arce and
Martı́nez-Jerez, 2009). Psychological research also suggests that the strongest reactions may come from higher
abilitycompetitors, becausehighperformanceexpectationsforthesecompetitors, bothfromothersandfromthe
competitors themselves, may create the greatest pressure to perform well (Baumeister and Showers, 1986).
Taken as a whole, prior research suggests that in addition to providing evidence regarding the underlying
mechanismsthatmayaccountforperformanceoutcomesinthefaceofincreasedcompetition,itisusefultoexam-
inewhichcompetitorsreactmoststronglytoincreasedcompetition,whotheyreactmoststronglyto,andwhether
they react positively or negatively. We analyze these issues using a detailed microeconomic data set from tour-
nament type contests sponsored by an online platform that produces commercial grade enterprise software and
algorithmicanalyticssolutions.5 Weobtaineddataonover4000computerprogrammerswhoparticipatedincon-
diverse set of competitors may be especially important in cases in which it is not known ex ante which individual will turn out to be best suited to
perform a task (Boudreau, Lacetera, and Lakhani, 2011).
4A review of the neurobiology literature by Arnsten (2012) covers several recent  indings on the interaction of stress and higher brain functions,
including the role of stress hormones in causing ``a rapid and dramatic loss of prefrontal cognitive abilities,'' thus impacting an individual's working
memory, the short-term memory used during computation.
5Boudreau, Lacetera, and Lakhani (2011) use the same data set to examine the relationship between an increasing number of contestants and
negative incentive effects as well as extreme-value outcomes from the point of view of a contest sponsor. They do not examine individual responses
or the role of superstars.
3tests requiring the creation of software solutions to three algorithmic problems at a time. The data have several
desirablefeatures, includingrandomassignmentofcompetitorstovirtualroomsinwhichtheycompete, multiple
observations per individual, a  ine-grained measure of ability for individual competitors, and performance out-
comes per individual in each contest (namely, a problem-solving score and an indicator of the presence of logical
errors). The data structure allows us to estimate the impact of the number and skill distribution of competitors
on individual performance, while controlling for programming ability and other individual- and contest-speci ic
effects. Wealsocanexaminehowtheseeffectsonindividualperformancevarybycompetitorability. Additionally,
the data contain information about the choices and actions of individual competitors, such as the amount of time
spent working on a problem. These data provide evidence regarding underlying mechanisms--such as effort, risk
taking, and cognitive errors--that may account for performance outcomes in the face of increased competition.
We begin by documenting performance outcomes in response to increased competition. As part of this anal-
ysis, we bring together two previously separate research streams: one that has focused on the impact of the to-
tal number of competitors on performance outcomes, and another that has focused on the impact of superstar
competitors. We  irst seek to replicate the result that contest participants have worse performance outcomes on
average when faced with a larger total number of competitors, or the ``N-effect'' for short.6 Consistent with prior
research,ourresultsshowthatalargernumberofcompetitorsleadstoworseperformanceoutcomesonaverage.
We then add the presence of superstars to the analysis, and  ind that this has an additional negative effect on per-
formanceoutcomes. Notably,botheffectsholdinthesamesettinganddata. Wethendecomposethetotalnumber
of competitors into superstars and non-superstars, and  ind that on average participants react much more neg-
atively to an increase in the number of superstars than to an increase in the number of non-superstars. We also
 indthatthesenegativeeffectsarestrongestinaparticularsubgroupofcompetitors: thosethatarehighlyskilled,
but whose abilities put them near to the top rather than at the top of the ability distribution. In addition, we  ind
that a small group of competitors, who are at the very top of the ability distribution (excluding superstars), react
positively to increased competition from superstars in particular.
Then we turn to an exploration of the underlying causes of these effects, particularly in higher ability com-
petitors that react most strongly to increased competition. For the near-to-the-top competitors that react most
negatively, we  ind no evidence that increased competition affects observable actions and strategic choices. For
example, an increase in the number of superstar and non-superstar competitors does not lead to either lower ob-
servable effort or greater risk-taking. Instead, these competitors make more errors of logic in response to greater
numbersofsuperstarsandnon-superstars,whichpointstoacognitiveexplanationforthedeclineinperformance.
In addition, for the small group of competitors at the very top of the ability distribution, we  ind some evidence of
increased effort and no increase in errors of logic, consistent with both an economic argument that competitors
on the edge of winning may exert maximum effort and psychological theories of self-con idence under pressure.
The paper proceeds as follows. section 2 describes the empirical context in detail. section 3 describes the
data set, variables, and estimation approach. section 4 through section 7 present results and analysis. section 8
concludes.
2 Empirical Context: Algorithm Contests at TopCoder Inc.
Data for our study comes from TopCoder, Inc., a web-based platform that delivers outsourced software solutions
for its clients through the use of online rank-order tournaments involving a member base of over 400,000 reg-
istered software developers (often referred to as ``coders''). Established in 2001, TopCoder works with large in-
formation technology intensive organizations (e.g., United Technologies, UBS, ING, IMS Health) to identify their
software requirements, which it converts into contests for its member base. These contests are open to all soft-
ware developers registered on the site and last several days or weeks; prize pools vary from $500 to more than
$50,000 depending on the contest. Since its founding, the  irm has transferred more than $35 million in prize
money and peer review fees to its members by conducting more than 10,000 tournaments for over 200 clients.
6This term was coined by Garcia and Tor (2009) in a study of students taking an SAT test in the presence of greater numbers of test-takers. We
use the term in the context of tournaments.
4TopCoder'svaluepropositiontoitsclientsistheavailabilityofahighlytalentedpoolofsoftwaredevelopersthat
areinterestedincompetingtoprovideclientsoftwaresolutions. TheclearestsignalofTopCoder'sabilitytodeliver
on the availability of talented software developers is the number of members that have received a skills rating,
which measures programming ability. Currently almost 50,000 members have received a TopCoder skills rating,
the vast majority through a series of ongoing algorithmic contests called single round match (SRM), which occur
online on a weekly to bi-weekly basis. Beyond providing a signal of platform capability to corporate clients, these
contestsservetorecruitmembersbycreatingatournamentenvironmentwheredeveloperscandemonstratetheir
skills against a global pool of competitors.
Inthisstudy, weanalyzeparticipationandperformancedatafromthesealgorithmcontests. TopCodergaveus
accesstothealgorithmcontestdata(2001-2007),andweconductedextensiveinterviewswiththe irm'sexecutive
team, its clients, and 20 elite members to improve our understanding of the contest setting.
2.1 Contest Structure
The main task in an algorithm contest is to solve three computer science algorithm problems in 75 minutes. The
problems are ``synthetic'', i.e., a TopCoder employee or member creates the problems in order to challenge the
competitors and derive their skills ratings. Mike Lydon, chief technology of icer for TopCoder and the principal
designer of the contest framework, explains:
``The problems we pose in the SRM contest are quite demanding and require more than the average
amount of mathematical and computer science knowledge along with creativity in exploiting and de-
veloping various algorithmic approaches and the ability to translate an abstract problem statement
into functional code in 75 minutes or less. To enable consistent testing and ratings of our member
base, wedesign our problemsso that wecan assess skills in areasas diverseas computational biology,
graph theory, image analysis and feature extraction, text mining and semantic analysis, and graphical
rendering, amongst many more.
Algorithm contests are held on different days of the week and times of day to encourage participation by Top-
Coder's global membership. TopCoder advertises contest dates and times well in advance through personalized
emails and website announcements. Registration to participate in a contest begins three hours before the start
timeandcloses iveminutesbeforetheconteststarts. Duringthisperiod,registeredcontestantscanchoosetowait
in a virtual chat room, engage in banter with other contestants, and browse information about other registered
competitors to get an idea of the skill levels and numbers of those competing in the event. An imprecise measure
of skill is readily available in that each coder is listed by handle7 , along with a color code that provides a rough
indicator of the coder's programming ability, based on TopCoder's skills ratings (described in more detail in the
next subsection). Participants can obtain more detailed information by looking up another coder's public pro ile
on TopCoder, which prominently displays a coder's skills rating and the percentile in which this rating places the
coder relative to others ).
Competition occurs in two divisions, I and II, based on participants' skills ratings. Division I consists of more
experienced individuals that have higher ratings of 1,200 or above. Division II consists of novices, unrated, and
lower-skilled software developers. Developers compete only against others in their division. Our empirical anal-
ysis focuses on Division I. This ensures that our analysis of the impact of competition on performance is not in-
 luenced by novices learning how the contests work, individuals casually trying out the platform, or low skilled
developers who may have dif iculty in the competitions regardless of the number and skill distribution of com-
petitors.
All registered competitors who have logged into the TopCoder platform, typically in the hundreds, are placed
into virtual competition rooms of around 20 competitors. TopCoder places competitors in rooms with others in
the same division; room placement within divisions is random. TopCoder's decision to divide registrants into
competition rooms of approximately 20 was driven by early feedback from members, who noted that too large a
7Acompetitor'shandleistheuniquepseudonymusedtoidentifythecompetitorontheTopCoderplatform. Mostonlinecommunitiesuseasimilar
system.
5competition room was intimidating and discouraging. TopCoder also discovered that keeping the room size rela-
tively small kept incentives high, because more contestants had a chance to win and place. Importantly, TopCoder
distributes the prize purse (if any) based on scoring well within a room. Prior to the start of the contest, a coder
does not know which other contest registrants will be in his (or her) competition room. Once the contest begins,
a coder has access to a sophisticated ``heads up'' display that provides information about the skill level of each
competitor in the room, access to competitors' pro iles, a real-time update that shows which competitors have
submitted solutions to which problems, and a live scoreboard showing provisional points awarded per problem
to each competitor.
Thecontestformattestsasoftwaredeveloper'sabilitytowritecodethataccuratelysolveseachproblemwhile
at the same time rewarding programming speed. Each contest has one easy problem, one problem of medium
dif iculty, and one hard problem. The point value of each problem indicates its dif iculty. The most common dis-
tribution of point values is 250, 500, and 1000 for the easy, medium, and hard problems, respectively, although
points per problem differ across contests due to differences in problem dif iculty, as does the total possible num-
ber of points per contest.
Participantshavenoinformationabouttheproblemsorpointvaluesuntilthecontestof iciallybegins. Oncethe
contest starts, participants see the point values for each of the three problems. The participants can then choose
to ``open'' any problem in any order and to submit solutions to problems in any order as well. However, as soon
as a coder opens a problem by clicking on the problem statement link, the points available to that contestant for
theproblemstarttodecline untiltheindividualsubmitsasolutionforanalysisand testing. Typically, competitors
open the three problems in order of dif iculty, from easiest to most dif icult. If a contestant opens more than one
problem simultaneously, the scores for all of the problems start to decline in the same manner until submissions
are made.
In order for a submission to be accepted for further evaluation, the submission must compile and have the
proper structure to accept input and produce output.8 Thus, accepted submissions contain no syntax errors or
incorrect function names. Once a coder's submission has been accepted, he receives provisional points based on
the length of time to submission. If a coder opens a problem but does not submit a solution, the coder receives
zero points for that problem.
After the 75 minute coding phase, a 15 minute challenge phase ensues. During this period, a coder may chal-
lenge the correctness of accepted submissions. For each challenge, a coder submits a test case (an input or set of
inputstotheprogram)forwhichanacceptedsubmissionbyanothercompetitorwillproduceincorrectoutput.9 If
a challenge is accurate, the challenger receives 50 points while the competitor loses all points for the submission.
If the challenge is inaccurate, the challenger loses 25 points. On average, individual competitors issue challenges
in about one-third of contests, typically issuing one or two challenges when they do.
Afterthechallengephase,thecontestmovesintoanautomatedtestingphase. TopCodersubjectseachsubmis-
sion to an automated barrage of test cases and corner conditions to ascertain whether the submission contains
logical errors. If a submission fails even one test case, the automated system immediately removes all points pro-
visionallyawardedforthatsubmission. Becauseincorrectsubmissionsreceivezeropoints,indecidinghowmuch
timetospendworkingonaproblembeforesubmittingasolution, acodermustbalancethereductioninpointsas
time spent working increases against the possibility that more time spent working could increase the likelihood
of a correct submission.
To calculate total points per contest for each coder, TopCoder sums the number of points for all correct sub-
missions as well as challenge points earned.
2.2 Rating System
TopCoder assigns a skills rating to each of its members based on points earned in algorithm contests. The rating
is an integer value that is updated at the end of each contest in which a member participates.
8Checking the syntactical functionality of a software code is similar to the ``hello, world'' test conducted by novice programmers. See http:
//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hello_world_program.
9If a challenge is correct, TopCoder incorporates it into the suite of test cases used in the subsequent automated testing phase.
6TopCoder uses an Elo type of rating system based on rank order performance (in terms of total points earned
per contest), similar to the system used in chess and many sports. In this widely-used type of rating system, the
underlying model of contest performance is not strategic; individual performance is presumed to depend only on
ability relative to other competitors and random noise. The system is designed to uncover a competitor's true
abilitywhencontestperformanceisanoisysignalofability. Herewebrie lydescribetheTopCoderratingsystem.
Appendix A provides a fuller explanation of the system.
To calculate a coder's rating at the end of each contest, the rating system  irst converts the total points scored
by each coder into an integer rank in the contest. The system also generates a predicted rank for each competitor,
based on a comparison of his pre-contest rating with the pre-contest ratings of other competitors. Both a com-
petitor's actual and predicted rank are adjusted for the number of competitors in the contest, and predicted rank
is also adjusted for the variability of a coder's prior ratings; these adjusted ranks are converted to their values in
an inverse standard normal distribution. Importantly, a coder's rating depends on where his rank in the contest
liesincomparisontohispredictedrankbasedonpastcontests. Forexample,ifacoder'spasthistorypredictsthat
he will have the 10th highest score in a contest, his rating will decrease if he places 11th. Conversely, his rating
will increase if he places 9th. Thus, the system ensures that a less highly rated competitor will not have his rating
fall simply because he scores below more highly rated competitors. In fact, a lower-rated competitor needs the
presence of higher-rated competitors in order to have a chance of improving his rating.
Theratingsystemisdesignedsothatacoder'spre-contestratingistheprimarydeterminantofthepost-contest
rating. The system attaches less weight to the difference between actual and predicted rank for coders with more
contest experience. In addition, a coder's post-contest rating cannot exceed his pre-contest rating by more than
a set value, which is an inverse function of the number of times that a coder has been rated. These features in-
sure that the ratings of coders with more contest experience change less over time than do the ratings of less
experienced coders.
2.3 Incentives and Motivations
Our interviews with TopCoder executives and elite members suggest a number of motivations for participating
in the algorithm contests. The most obvious relates to the potential to win prize money. In the early days of the
platform, TopCoder grew its member base by offering money to the ``Top Coders'' who were able to win contests.
This established the TopCoder platform and its rating system as a legitimate avenue for both testing and record-
ing skills in the software community. After TopCoder had established a critical mass of developers, the company
gradually withdrew monetary awards for participating in algorithm contests and instead provided prize money
largely through client-speci ic contests. In total, TopCoder has distributed over $1 million in prize money to its
algorithm contest participants. In all, about 20 percent of the contests in our data have a monetary reward, with
an average of approximately $1,300 in prize money per contest. Prizes are awarded by room, usually to the top
two competitors; coders that win a prize receive an average of $51.
AnotherprominentreasontocompeteinTopCoderalgorithmcontestsistoreceiveaTopCoderrating. Because
theratingmeasuresprogrammingability,anumberofsoftwaredevelopment irmsrequestthatjobapplicantsget
a TopCoder rating before applying. Some  irms (e.g., Google, Facebook, Microsoft) sponsor algorithm contests to
signal the importance they place on the TopCoder rating. In fact, TopCoder receives more referrals to its website
fromGoogle'swebpageforjobapplicantsthanfromanyothersource. OneTopCodermembernotedthatobtaining
ahighratingisnon-trivial--requiringfamiliaritywithmanytypesofalgorithms,quickthinking,strongworkethic,
attentiontodetail,andoverall``smarts''. Thismemberalsonotedthatsomeofhisfriendshadobtainedjobsathigh
pro ile technology  irms because of their TopCoder rating. Hence, the rating possesses value through improved
job prospects and earnings.
In addition to obtaining a TopCoder rating, many developers compete in algorithm contests in order to learn
and become better programmers. Developers gain experience during the competition itself, and can learn from
otherparticipantsinpost-competitiondiscussion. TopCodermakessubmittedsolutionsavailableforcompetitors
toview,andmemberstypicallydiscussanddissectthesolutionsafteracompetition. Aftereachcontest,members
create a full commentary on each problem and the various solution approaches used in submissions. Members
7across the entire skills distribution note the advantage of learning through competitions. One highly-rated mem-
ber, who prominently has displayed his TopCoder rating on his CV, notes on his resume page:
``I regularly participate in and organize a number of programming comptetitions [sic]. As a result, I
am familiar with a vast number of algorithmic problems from all areas of computer science. Among
the thousands of people who participate in these competitions, I am consistently ranked in the top 50
worldwide. Frankly, I believe that these competitions have taught me more about computer science
and programming than all of the university courses. (Ivor Naverinouk, engineer at Google)
Finally, TopCoder members and executives report that the competition format is itself motivating. One mem-
ber stated (Lakhani, Garvin, and Lonstein, 2010): ``To be successful at TopCoder, you must ask yourself, `Are you
a competitor?' You need to be able to thrive on competition; you can't be scared of it.'' TopCoder's founder and
chairman, Jack Hughes (2012) remarked that: ``Competition - in games, sports, intellectual exercises (chess, sci-
ence and math) - is motivating because it is at the core of how we improve. It is dif icult to improve at something
unless you measure it. Once you measure, you are competing - even if only with yourself - against the clock or to
get a better grade for instance. There is real value in simply trying to do something.'' Much as many people join
informal,pick-upgamesoffootballorbasketball,developersenjoythecompetitioninTopCoderevents,especially
algorithm contests, as a way to exercise and demonstrate their software skills.
The strength of these various incentives and motivations varies by contest and competitor. Most algorithm
contests, for example, do not offer monetary prizes. In addition, as noted above, pre-contest ratings are the pri-
mary determinant of post-contest ratings for experienced participants, who make up the majority of competitors
in the algorithm contests. Certainly, sustained increases or decreases in  inal points over multiple contests will
change an individual's rating. But for most competitors, the rating system insures that points earned in a single
contest do not have a large impact their ratings. As a result, ratings provide a strong incentive mainly for new
members and for those with little prior experience. Thus, for many coders, monetary rewards and ratings do not
explain why individuals choose to compete in these contests. Rather, opportunities to learn, as well as a desire to
exercise programming skills and demonstrate them to others, appear to be strong motivating factors.
3 Dataset, Variables, and Estimation Strategy
Our data analysis focuses on the years 2004-2007. In the years prior to this, TopCoder executives experimented
with contest formats and room assignment algorithms before settling on a stable approach to the algorithm con-
tests. Thisdatasetisanunbalancedpanel,asnotallTopCodermemberscompeteineverycontest. Asnotedearlier,
we focus on Division I, which comprises the more highly skilled software developers.
Ourdatacontain recordsonover4000participantsactivein181 events. Toassess theimpactonperformance
outcomes of the number and skill distribution of competitors, we analyze competition at the room level. During a
competition,theinformationthatcodersreceiveabouttheircompetitorsoccursattheroomlevel. Asnotedearlier,
TopCoder provides a vivid representation of the number and abilities of competitors in a room, and an up-to-date
scoreboard that indicates submissions by each competitor in the room, as well as provisional points awarded for
each submission. In addition, the distribution of prizes (if any) and post-coding challenges occur within rooms.
3.1 Outcome Variables
As noted earlier, TopCoder measures the problem-solving effectiveness of a participant by summing the total
points earned at the end of a contest, denoted by the variable  inal points. This is the dependent variable in our
initial analysis of the effect of increased competition on performance outcomes. In a subsidiary analysis, we de-
compose inalpointsintothoseforthe irst(easy),second(mediumdif iculty),andthird(hard)problems,andthe
challengephase. Finalpointsdependheavilyontheamountoftimespentworkingonproblems,thecorrectnessof
submissions,andpointsearnedduringthechallengephase. Weusetheseasdependentvariablesinananalysisof
themechanismsthatunderlietheperformanceoutcomesthatweobserve. Thethreevariablesare: minutesspent
working, an observable measure of effort per problem: challenge issued, a dummy variable indicating whether a
8coder issued a challenge, another observable measure of effort; and incorrect submission, a dummy variable that
indicates whether a submission failed a challenge or system test due to a mistake in coding caused by a logical
error.
3.2 Explanatory Variables
3.2.1 Number of Competitors in the Room
The number of competitors in a virtual contest room, number in room, is our  irst explanatory variable. Figure 1
illustrates the variation in the number of competitors in our data. The mean number of competitors per room is
18.6, with 85 percent of rooms having 17-20 competitors, providing a 15-20 percent variation in the number of
competitors.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Two factors lead to variation in the number of competitors in a contest room: 1) TopCoder's room allocation
system, and 2) coders that register for a contest but do not compete. As coders register for a contest, TopCoder
aims to  ill each virtual competition room with 20 contestants. Participants do not arrive in even groups of 20,
however,causingamathematicalindivisibilityproblemfortheroomallocationsystem. Thesystemdealswiththis
problem by trying to create rooms that have roughly the same number of competitors, with no large imbalances
between rooms. In addition, during the three-hour registration period, some members who have signed up may
decide not to compete. If some registered contestants do not show up at the start of the contest, it affects the
number of competitors in a room, because it is too late for the room allocation system to adjust for their absence.
As noted earlier, coders do not receive their room assignments until the contest begins. Although the room
allocation system assigns ``no-show'' members to a room during the registration period, other competitors have
noknowledgeoftheirpresence. No-showmembersalsodonotknowtheidentityofthecompetitorsintheirroom
orthenatureoftheproblemsbeforeacontestbegins. Whilewecannotdirectlyobservethereasonswhymembers
donotshowupafterregistering,investigationofthedataindicatesthataverageroomsizesareloweronweekdays
than on weekends (holding total contest participation constant), suggesting that coders  ind it harder to predict
theirschedulesduringweekdaysthanonweekends. Ourinterviewswithparticipantsrevealedthatreasonsfornot
showing up included getting caught up in work activities, social pressures such as friends and spouses needing
their attention, and miscalculating when a TV show would be on (e.g., Battlestar Galactica). Hence, the factors
leading to variation in the number of competitors in a room appear to be exogenous to the contests themselves.
Nevertheless,intheempiricalanalysis,wecontrolforthetotalnumberofcompetitorspercontest,dayoftheweek,
and month (e.g., coders may have greater amounts of vacation time during certain months).
3.2.2 Identifying Dominant Competitors (``Superstars'')
Highlydominantcompetitorsmakeitdif icultforotherstorankatthetopinacontest. Brown(2011),forexample,
identi iesasingleindividual--TigerWoods(whenhewashighlydominant)--asasuperstar,anduseshispresence
or absence in a tournament to identify a superstar effect. In our context, we identify a set of overwhelmingly
dominant competitors whose abilities indicate that they are likely to score well above other competitors in the
room. The number of these ``superstars'' in a room is our second explanatory variable.
The procedure used to identify superstars begins by generating a predicted score ( inal points) for each com-
petitorineachcontest. Todothis,foreachyearinoursample(2004-2007),we irstestimatethefollowingmodel,
using data from all contests in the previous three years:
𝑝   = ? + ?Rating   + 𝜈Rating
 
   + ?𝑋       
  + 𝜖   (1)
• 𝑝  :  inal points for coder 𝑖 in contest 𝑡
• Rating  : pre-contest rating
9• Rating
 
  : pre-contest rating squared
• 𝑋       
  : contest-speci ic controls
Coder ability, measured by a coder's pre-contest TopCoder rating, is likely to be a key determinant of  inal
points. In addition, we include several control variables. The squared ratings help control for non-linearity in
pre-contest ratings.10 Contest-speci ic controls, which improve the precision of the model, include the number of
competitors in the contest, the point value of each problem, an indicator of whether prize money was available,
year of the contest, and month and day of the week dummy variables.
For each year in the sample, to generate predicted scores for each competitor in a given contest, E𝑝  , the
estimatedcoef icientsfromequation1areappliedtodataforeachcoderinthatcontest. Thestandarddeviationsof
these ittedvaluesarestoredforeachobservation. Thesevaryforeachobservationbasedontheparticularvalues
of the covariates associated with that particular coder and contest. We then generate a predicted performance
interval for the  inal score of each competitor in the contest, as follows:
[E𝑝   − 4 × 𝑠.𝑑.  ,E𝑝   + 4 × 𝑠.𝑑.  ]
The prediction interval for the  inal score of each competitor in the contest ranges from four standard devi-
ations below the point estimate to four standard deviations above the point estimate, encompassing a relatively
large range of potential performance per competitor. These prediction intervals are intended to capture coders'
``competitiveproximity''toothercontestparticipants. Twocompetitorswhoseintervalsoverlapcouldreasonably
expect to place near one another in a contest and are considered close, as illustrated in Figure 2.
[Figure 2 about here.]
CompetitorsAandBmayalsobeindirectlyproximateifA'sintervaloverlapsthatofanothercompetitorwhose
interval overlaps that of B. In order to account for this situation (and further indirection), we take the union of all
prediction intervals, as shown in Figure 2. All competitors in a union of predicted intervals are considered part of
the same competitive group.
Figure3illustratestheprocessofassigningcompetitorstocompetitivegroupsforanactualroominourdataset.
Group numbers are assigned from the lowest expected scores to the highest, starting at 1. If a room contains at
least two groups, superstar competitors are those in the highest competitive group. Any individual not in the
superstar group is considered a non-superstar.
[Figure 3 about here.]
This procedure for identifying superstar competitors labels 541 competitors as superstars in at least one con-
test in our sample. The average room has 1.31 superstar competitors, with a median of 1. Ninety-three percent
of rooms have 3 or fewer superstar competitors; 13 percent of rooms have only one competitive group and thus
have no superstars. On average, a competition room has 2.93 groups, with a median of 3 groups per room. Fig-
ure 4 and Figure 5 display histograms of the number of superstars per room and the number of groups per room,
respectively.
[Figure 4 about here.]
[Figure 5 about here.]
Inordertosimplifypresentationoftheresults,ouranalysisincludesonlyobservationsfornon-superstarcom-
petitors. All results hold when using the full dataset; there are no changes in levels of signi icance and point esti-
mates are very close in magnitude to those presented here.
10This turns out to have little impact on predicted scores. We omit it in our primary speci ication in the main part of our analysis of the effects of
increased competition.
103.3 Estimation Approach
Weseektoestimatetheimpactonindividualperformanceofincreasedcompetitioninthecontestoverallandfrom
competitors of different types, especially highly dominant ones. We estimate a linear model in which the perfor-
mance outcome for each competitor in each contest depends linearly on numbers of competitors in total and of
different types, as well as on other separable factors such as coder ability and speci ic features of the contest
environment. We also include individual competitor (coder)  ixed effects; the model thus exploits performance
variationwithinindividualsacrosscontests. Inprinciple,randomassignmentofcompetitorstoroomsimpliesthat
unobservedcodercharacteristicsdonotvarysystematicallywithourexplanatoryvariablesofinterest. Neverthe-
less, we include individual competitor  ixed effects in order to preclude bias due to unobserved heterogeneity of
coders.
Our primary speci ication is a linear model with competitor  ixed effects that regresses  inal points for each
competitorineachcontest,𝑝  ,onmeasuresofthenumberofcompetitorsintheroom(total,superstar,and/ornon
superstar), as described in the next section; the speci ication also controls for coder ability and speci ic features
of each contest. For purposes of illustration, in Equation 2 below, 𝑁   denotes the total number of competitors in
a room faced by competitor 𝑖 in contest 𝑡. To control for ability, we use a coder's pre-contest TopCoder rating. We
also control for features of the contest environment: the point value of each of the three problems in a contest,
the number of competitors in the entire contest, a dummy variable indicating whether prize money was offered
in the contest, the year of the contest (2004-2007), and dummy variables for day of the week (Saturday omitted)
and month (June omitted). The variable 𝜇  indicates individual competitor  ixed effects.
𝑝   = ? + ?𝑁   + 𝜈𝑋
       
   + ?𝑋       
  + 𝜇  + 𝜖   (2)
Because competitors self-select into the TopCoder member base and into each contest, this could bias our es-
timated coef icients. In particular, self-selection might affect the distribution of coder ability in a contest. If a
particular contest draws a larger proportion of highly skilled competitors than usual, although this would not
cause the total number of competitors per room to increase, it could lead to a larger number of superstar com-
petitors in a room on average (since TopCoder assigns competitors randomly to rooms). Examination of the data
reveals no difference in the distribution of coder ability per contest associated with month or day of the week. In-
deed,theonlyfactorthatappearstobecorrelatedwiththedistributionofcoderabilitypercontestisprizemoney:
contests that offer prize money tend to have a larger number of total competitors because these contests draw a
larger number of high ability coders. The inclusion in Equation 2 of the indicator for prize money helps to control
for possible sample selection bias from this source. This variable also helps to control for any shift in competitor
behavior due to the potential to obtain a monetary reward.
Table 11 in B provides descriptive statistics for all variables used in our analyses.
4 The Effects of Competition
In what follows, we use the speci ication in Equation 2 to  irst estimate the impact of the total number of com-
petitors on individual performance, so as to assess whether an N-effect holds. We then add the total number
of superstar competitors to the analysis. In addition, we decompose the total number of competitors into the
number of superstars and the number of non-superstars. Then we conduct more  ine-grained analysis to assess
whether the effects of increased competition vary with the ability of competitors, and to further ascertain which
competitors may be driving our overall results. We also conduct robustness tests of this analysis using alternate
speci ications, before examining mechanisms that may underlie our results.
4.1 The N-Effect
Asnotedearlier,tournamenttheoryimpliesthatanincreaseinthenumberofcompetitorslowersindividualeffort.
In order to check for the presence of an N-effect, we regress  inal points on the total number of competitors in
11the room (𝑁  ), using the  ixed-effects speci ication in Equation 2. Table 1 reports the results. As predicted by
theory and consistent with prior empirical studies, we  ind a signi icant but small negative effect on performance
outcomesasthenumberofcompetitorsintheroomincreases. Onaverage, inalpointsearnedbyacompetitorfall
by about 2 points for each additional competitor in the room. The magnitude of the effect is similar to that seen
in earlier work with this dataset Boudreau, Lacetera, and Lakhani (2011).11
[Table 1 about here.]
4.2 The Superstar Effect
In tournaments, theory suggests that the presence of competitors of signi icantly higher ability (superstars) will
reduce the efforts of those with lower ability (Szymanski and Valletti, 2005; Brown, 2011). We therefore extend
the speci ication in Equation 2 by including the number of superstar competitors in a room faced by competitor 𝑖
in contest 𝑡 (𝑆𝑆  ).12
𝑝   = ? + ? 𝑁   + ? 𝑆𝑆   + 𝜈𝑋
       
   + ?𝑋       
  + 𝜇  + 𝜖   (3)
This speci ication is motivated by Brown's (2011) study, which compared performance in golf tournaments
with and without Tiger Woods (the superstar). In golf, the total number of competitors per tournament is always
thesameandthenumberofsuperstarsswitchesbetweenzeroandone,dependingonwhetherornotTigerWoods
competes. In a similar spirit, we estimate the impact of a larger or smaller number of superstars holding the
total number of competitors constant. Thus, the superstar effect in Equation 3 can be interpreted as the impact
of a competitor switching from non-dominant to dominant, holding the total number of competitors per room
constant. In this speci ication, consistent with empirical evidence in Brown (2011) and other studies, replacing a
non-superstarwithasuperstarintheroomleadstoareductionin inalpointsearnedbyeachcompetitorofabout
2.5 points, as shown in Table 2.
[Table 2 about here.]
Unlike in golf and other sporting events, the total number of competitors in TopCoder tournaments varies.
Thus, the total number of competitors per room may increase due to an increase in the number of superstars,
an increase in the number of non-superstars, or both. Moreover, the overall effect of increased competition may
depend on which types of competitors cause the total number of competitors to vary. A variant of Equation 3
captures these effects by decomposing the total number of competitors into the number of superstars (𝑆𝑆  ) and
non-superstars (𝑁𝑆𝑆  ):
(4) 𝑝   = ? + ? 𝑁𝑆𝑆   + ? 𝑆𝑆   + 𝜈𝑋
       
   + ?𝑋       
  + 𝜇  + 𝜖  
The speci ication in Equation 4 provides an estimate of the effect of adding a superstar to the room while
holding the number of non-superstars constant, and vice versa, which is a natural interpretation of the effects
of increased competition in the TopCoder context. In contrast, Equation 2 constrains the effect of adding one
more superstar to be the same as the effect of adding one more non-superstar, which presumes that the impact
of adding a competitor to the room is the same regardless of that individual's ability. In Equation 3, the estimated
coef icient on the number of superstars also does not provide an accurate estimate of the full effect of adding one
moresuperstartotheroom: theestimatedcoef icientonNre lectstheeffectofaddingonemoresuperstarwhenit
isconstrainedtoequalthatforanon-superstar,andtheestimatedcoef icientonSSre lectsanyadditionaleffectof
one more superstar beyond that captured by the estimated coef icient on N. Although Equation 3 and Equation 4
are similar, Equation 4 more easily provides estimates of the full superstar effect, and more importantly, makes
11Boudreau, Lacetera, and Lakhani (2011)  ind a somewhat higher effect of approximately 5 points per competitor, but at the room-problem level
rather than the individual-contest level and under a different speci ication.
12In our dataset, the number of superstar competitors per room is not particularly correlated with the total number of competitors per room, with
a coef icient of correlation of 0.02.
12it easy to tell which types of competitors account for the overall effect of increased competition on performance.
Therefore, we base our subsequent analyses on the speci ication in Equation 4.13 As shown in Table 3, for this
speci ication, adding a superstar to the room leads to a reduction in  inal points per competitor of 5.7, and adding
a non-superstar leads to a reduction in  inal points of 2.6.
[Table 3 about here.]
In summary, consistent with previous work, we  ind evidence of small but signi icant performance losses as
thetotalnumberofcompetitorsincreases. Wealso indthatincreasedcompetitionfrombothsuperstarsandnon-
superstarshasanegativeeffectonperformance,butthesuperstareffectissubstantiallygreater. Thisprovidesnew
evidence that at least in some settings, the overall effect of increased competition may in fact re lect a substantial
superstar effect.
5 Heterogeniety in the Response to Competition
The effects just identi ied apply to the average participant in a contest. However, prior research suggests that the
reaction to competition may vary with the ability of competitors. For example, Brown (2011) found that in PGA
golf tournaments, Tiger Woods had an effect on the top half of the competitor  ield in terms of ability, but not the
lower half.
Figure 6 depicts the impact of increased competition for each TopCoder rating in our dataset. To generate this
 igure, we use a two-stage estimation process. In the  irst stage, we regress  inal points against our control vari-
ables, usingalinearspeci icationwithindividualcompetitor ixed-effects(thatis, Equation4withoutthenumber
of superstars and non-superstars ).14 In the second stage, we use a locally-weighted OLS speci ication to regress
the irst-stageresiduals(excluding ixedeffects)againstourmeasuresofcompetition,namely,thenumberofnon-
superstarsandthenumberofsuperstarsintheroom. Thesecond-stageregressionisrunseparatelyforeveryrat-
ing in the dataset, from 1200 to 3754. The regression uses a triangular kernel to weight the observations at each
rating; a bandwidth of 300 rating points was used to generate the plots (see Yatchew (1998) and Greene (2003)
for additional discussion of the choice of kernel and bandwidth ).15 The coef icient estimates and standard errors
for our competition measures from each regression (on the vertical axis) are then plotted against each rating (on
the horizontal axis) in Figure 6.
[Figure 6 about here.]
The plots in Figure 6 indicate large negative effects for competitors in approximately the 83rd to 94th per-
centiles of the ability distribution. For competitors with lower ratings (below about 2050), the negative effects
are much smaller. At the far right of the plots, competitors with very high ratings show some evidence of an in-
crease in score as the number of superstars and non-superstars increases. However, there are few competitors in
this range and standard errors grow quite large.
13Note that because             , the estimated coef icient on     in Equation 4 is essentially the same as the estimated coef icient on   in
Equation 3. In Equation 3,                    (            )                      (       )    .
14In estimating the relationship between ratings and competition effects, we tried three additional approaches: dividing ratings into 10 regions
with indicator variables, one-stage kernel estimates using OLS, and the two-stage differenced approach used in Yatchew (1998). All show a similar
pattern of behavior. In the two-stage approach that we present, the  irst stage estimates may be biased if the competition effects are correlated with
our control variables (see Yatchew (1998) for a discussion). However, one-stage OLS and the differenced approach do not allow for the inclusion of
competitor ixed-effects. Asthe irst-stagecoef icientestimateswithourcontrolvariablesweresimilartotheestimatesobtainedfromthedifferenced
approach, we felt that controlling for competitor heterogeneity in the  irst stage was the best option.
15Givenanin initesupplyofdata,themostaccurateapproachwouldbetoobtaincoef icientestimatesforeachratinginthedatasetusingonlydata
forcompetitorswiththatrating. Datalimitationsmakethisinfeasible. Therefore,toobtainthecoef icientestimatesateachrating,weincludedataon
``nearby'' competitors whose ratings place them within an estimation window that is 300 rating points wide, termed the ``bandwidth'', centered on
theratingforwhichtheestimatesaretobegenerated. Arelativelywidebandwidthincorporatesmoredataandtendstoresultinasmootherestimated
relationship, but too large a bandwidth may include observations that are not relevant for the rating in question. We tried several bandwidths from
50 to 300 rating points, and all showed a similar relationship. In addition to the choice of bandwidth, which determines which observations are
included in the estimation at each rating in the dataset, the observations within the estimation window can be weighted so that observations closer
to the rating in question are given more weight than those toward the edges of the estimation window. Data points closer to the rating in question
are more informative about the relationship being estimated. The choice of kernel determines this weighting and provides another tool to smooth
the estimated relationship. Our plot uses a triangular kernel so the weight falls linearly with the distance from the center of the estimation window.
In practice, the choice of kernel is rarely crucial in obtaining estimates (Greene, 2003).
13Closer examination of the data underlying the plots in Figure 6 enables us to de ine a ``performance deterio-
ration zone'' (PDZ) that encompasses the strongest negative reactions to increased competition. This zone, with
ratings in the range of 2051 to 2414, encloses the largest magnitude of negative effects seen in the kernel esti-
mates, as depicted in Figure 6. Although the boundaries of this range are somewhat blurred due to the use of
kernel-based methods, the analysis reported next is not sensitive to the precise location of the upper and lower
boundaries of the PDZ.
To further investigate the sources of these effects of increased competition, we decompose the  inal points of
eachcompetitorintopointsearnedforeachofthethreeproblemsandpointsearnedthroughchallenges. Figure7
depicts plots for points earned on each problem and through challenges, using the same kernel-based technique
described earlier. The response seen in total points is mechanically the sum of the responses for these four sub-
scores. As shown in Figure 7, most of the response to increased competition revolves around the third problem.
The points earned from problems 1 (easy) and 2 (medium dif iculty) and from challenges show little response to
competition across the ability distribution.
[Figure 7 about here.]
The information from the kernel analysis enables us to estimate regressions that more precisely assess how
competitorsofdifferentlevelsofabilityreacttoincreasedcompetition. Weuseindicatorsofwhetheracompetitor
is below, within, or above the PDZ, and interact each indicator with the number of superstars and the number of
non-superstarsintheroom. Table4presentsestimatesusingthenewspeci icationwith inalpointsasthedepen-
dent variable, as well as with points earned for each of the problems ( irst, second, and third) and the challenge
score as dependent variables.
[Table 4 about here.]
As anticipated, competitors in the PDZ show signi icant negative effects of increased competition on  inal
points, which drop by about 7.5 points per additional non-superstar in the room and by about 20 points for each
additionalsuperstar. Inaddition, competitorswhoseratingsareabovethePDZshowadecreasein inalpointsfor
each additional non-superstar. These competitors also show an increase in points for each additional superstar, a
result to which we return later.
For coders below the PDZ, Table 4 shows that these coders react negatively, albeit less strongly, to increased
competition. Like the more skilled competitors in the PDZ, lower ability coders react more negatively to the num-
ber of superstars than to the number of non-superstars. This reaction centers on problems 1 and 2, most likely
becauselessskilledcompetitorsconcentrateonthelessdif icultproblems. Conversely,morehighlyskilledcoders
withinandabovethePDZhaveasigni icantreactiontoincreasedcompetitiononlyforproblem3,themostdif icult
problem. Indeed, we see no signi icant reactions of the more highly skilled coders for the less dif icult problems,
which are likely to prove less demanding for these coders and therefore may elicit less of a reaction to increased
competition.
Insection7,weexamineunderlyingmechanismsthatmaydrivetheseperformanceoutcomes. Wefocusonthe
third problem, which accounts for a large portion of the effect on performance, and on the most affected group of
codersinthePDZandabovethePDZ,asdoingsoprovidesthemoststatisticalpowerforidentifyingtheunderlying
mechanisms. Narrowingthefocustoasingleproblemreducesthedimensionsofcompetitoractionsconsiderably;
essentially, we no longer need to consider all actions in triplicate. However, we emphasize that this selection of
focus is driven by the dataset, and may not generalize to other contexts.
6 Robustness
Before proceeding to an examination of mechanisms that may underpin the effects of increased competition, we
conductrobustnesstestsofourprimarycompetitor ixedeffectsspeci ication. Inparticular,weexaminealternate
approaches to controlling for heterogeneity across coders and contests, using the speci ication just reported in
Table 4 for the third problem as the basis for comparison.
14Table5reportstheresultsoftheserobustnesstests. Columnonereportscoef icientestimatesfromanordinary-
least-squares (OLS) speci ication with no controls. The speci ication in column two accounts for heterogeneity
through the addition of individual competitor  ixed effects but without controls for competitor ability or contest
features. Notably, in both alternate speci ications, the coef icient estimates and signi icance levels are similar to
those in our primary speci ication, shown in column three for ease of comparison. This suggests that the results
reportedearlierarehighlyrobust,evenwithoutcontrollingforcompetitorability,competitor ixedeffects,orspe-
ci ic contestfeatures. In addition, as shownin column  ive, the inclusion of the number of previous conteststhat a
competitor has entered, which accounts for any potential impact of contest experience on performance, has little
impactontheresults;theestimatedcoef icientsandsigni icancelevelsarealmostidenticaltothoseintheprimary
speci ication.
[Table 5 about here.]
Asanalternatemethodofcontrollingforheterogeneityincontests,wereplacethecontestcontrolswithcontest
 ixed effects, omitting competitor  ixed effects. (Including  ixed effects can account for heterogeneity in competi-
tors or contests, but not both simultaneously.) Using contest  ixed effects shifts the identi ication from within
competitors, across contests to within contests, across competitors. As shown in column four, the results seen
in the primary speci ication for competitors in the PDZ and above the PDZ continue to hold. The coef icient on
non-superstars for competitors below the PDZ becomes signi icant and has a positive sign, however. This may be
an artifact of the room allocation procedure described earlier, which does not adjust for no-shows (coders who
register for a contest but do not compete). No-shows are likely to be concentrated among non-superstars, simply
because superstars are rare by de inition; this in turn will drive variation in the number of non-superstars in the
room. Having fewer non-superstars due to no-shows especially bene its lower ability contestants, who are below
the PDZ, leading to the positive coef icient.
In addition to robustness tests of our primary speci ication, we conduct robustness tests involving the super-
stareffect. First,wereplacethevariableforthenumberofsuperstarswithdummyvariablesindicatingwhethera
roomhasone, two, three, four, or iveormoresuperstars, andinteracteachofthesedummyvariableswiththein-
dicatorsforcodersbelowthePDZ,inthePDZ,andabovethePDZ.Theresults,showninTable12inB,aregenerally
consistent with those reported earlier, although they exhibit some variability due to lower degrees of freedom for
eachinteractionterm. Overall,theresultssuggestthatthereactiontointensi iedcompetitiontendstoincreaseas
the number of superstars increases.
One concern with the procedure for identifying superstar competitors is that it may create a mechanical ef-
fect on performance. As the number of superstar competitors increases and more of the high ability competitors
are labeled superstars, the average ability of non-superstar competitors may fall, leading to a negative effect on
performance. In order to check that such a selection effect is not driving the results, we run our analysis on a
restricted set of rooms in which the number of dominant competitors is less than k (where k is either 3 or 4), and
includeintheanalysisonlycompetitorspredictedtohavearankofmorethank-1(whereahighernumericalrank
indicates placing less well). For this population, the top k-1 competitors are never included in the analysis, even
if they are not superstars; the analysis is run with N-k-1 competitors per room, insuring that the average ability
of non-dominant competitors varies only with N and not with the number of superstars. The results, shown in
Table 6, are consistent with the results from the full sample.16
[Table 6 about here.]
7 Mechanisms and Competitor Actions
As our estimates of the effects of increased competition from both superstars and non-superstars appear robust,
wecontinuetheanalysisbyexaminingunderlyingmechanismsthatmayaccountfortheseresults. Inwhatfollows,
we continue to focus on points earned on the third problem.
16In order to improve precision of the estimates for the control variables, all competitors are included in the analysis. For each regression on the
restricted set of rooms with less than   superstars, only competitors in those rooms are used to estimate the interaction terms shown in Table 6, by
interacting these terms with a dummy variable indicating whether an observation comes from a room with less than   superstars.
15To begin, Figure 8 displays kernel estimates of the impact of the number of superstars and non-superstars on:
1. points earned on the third problem, 2. the correctness of submissions, and 3. minutes spent working on sub-
missions. The y-axes are scaled so that the vertical distance in correctness and minutes spent working roughly
corresponds to the same vertical distance for points on the third problem. The  igure suggests that the response
toincreasedcompetitionseeninpointsonthethirdproblemisstronglyrelatedtothecorrectnessofsubmissions.
Whereas time spent working shows little response to increased competition across the ratings distribution, cor-
rectness of submissions closely tracks the changes in points.
[Figure 8 about here.]
Regression analysis using our primary  ixed effects speci ication supports the patterns shown in Figure 8. As
indicated earlier, we focus on the most affected groups, namely, coders in the PDZ and above the PDZ. Table 7
reports the estimated effect of increased competition on minutes spent working on all submissions for the third
problem, and on minutes spent working on correct submissions only.17 For minutes spent working on all sub-
missions, the only signi icant reaction comes from coders in the PDZ, who take longer to submit as the number of
non-superstarsincreases. Forminutesspentworkingoncorrectsubmissions,againonlycodersinthePDZhavea
signi icantreaction,butatthe10percentlevelofsigni icanceandtoanincreaseinthenumberofsuperstarsrather
than non-superstars. Although these estimates suggest some reaction of those in the PDZ, they are inconsistent
regarding the cause (superstars or non-superstars), and the reaction to superstars is not highly signi icant.
[Table 7 about here.]
In contrast to the somewhat inconclusive results for minutes spent working, we  ind a highly signi icant in-
crease in incorrect submissions for those in the PDZ in reaction to both superstars and non-superstars, as re-
ported in Table 8.18 Submissions by this group are incorrect about 2 percent more often for each additional non-
superstar and about 5 percent more often for each additional superstar. In addition, competitors above the PDZ,
whosescoresonthethirdproblemshowapositiveresponsetoadditionalsuperstars,areestimatedtobeincorrect
about 1 percent less often for each additional superstar, although the effect is statistically insigni icant. A Wald
test, however, con irms that the marginal effect for these competitors is signi icantly below that of competitors in
the PDZ, who are most strongly affected.
[Table 8 about here.]
7.1 Causes of Performance Deterioration
Theseresultssuggestthatthenegativeeffectsofincreasedcompetitionareassociatedwithagreaterlikelihoodof
making an error on the most dif icult problem, rather than with an increase in time to submission. This effect is
concentrated among coders in the PDZ who are near but not at the top of the ability distribution. Potential causes
ofincreasederrorsincludedeliberate(conscious)actionsaswellasunconsciousreactionsinthefaceofincreased
competition. Nextweassesswhetherdeliberatechoicesbycompetitors,suchasincreasingtheriskinessofcontest
strategy or reducing effort, may explain the performance decrements that we observe.
7.2 Risk-taking
During contests, competitors may take strategic risks. For example, consider a losing football team that runs a
``Hail Mary'' play in the last seconds of a game to try to eke out a victory. Although risky, if the play succeeds, the
team wins the game. Similarly, in algorithm contests, consider the extreme case of a competitor who cares only
aboutplacing irstintheroom. Thisislikelytocausethecompetitortospendlesstimeworkingonaproblemandto
17These analyses include only coders that opened the third problem.
18In order to improve precision of the estimates for the control variables, all competitors are included in the analysis. Competitors who did not
openthethirdproblemarecodedashavinganincorrectsubmission. Onlycompetitorswhoopenedandsubmittedasolutiontothethirdproblemare
usedtoestimatetheinteractiontermsshowninTable8,byinteractingthesetermswithadummyvariableindicatingwhethertherewasasubmission
for the third problem.
16submit a solution earlier than otherwise, which increases the provisional score (before correctness is evaluated).
Although this strategy increases the risk that the submission is incorrect and receives zero points, it will increase
thepointsawardedfortheproblemifitiscorrect--enablingthecompetitortoplacemorehighlyintheroom. More
generally, if competitors employ a riskier strategy of this sort, they will submit solutions more quickly with some
positive probability.
We look for evidence of such an approach in the amount of time spent working on submissions for the third
problem. The average time spent working should fall if competitors shift to submitting fast but more error-prone
solutions. The second column of Table 7 shows that the only signi icant effect on minutes spent working on sub-
missionscomesfromcodersinthePDZinthefaceofanincreasednumberofnon-superstars. Thiseffectispositive
rather than negative, however, providing no evidence that competitors switch to riskier strategies in the face of
increased competition.
7.3 Observed Effort
Perhaps the simplest explanation for the decrease in performance that we observe is reduced effort by competi-
tors. As the likely placement of a competitor falls due to increased competition, the expected bene it of exerting
effort falls as well. A competitor then may  ind it in his interest to reduce opportunity costs by reducing effort.
Forevidenceofreducedeffort,weexaminethreeindicatorsthatcompetitorsstopworkearly,essentiallydrop-
ping out of the contest. First, we examine whether competitors open the third problem. If a competitor fails to
openthethirdproblem,hemaynolongerbetryingtoearnpointsinthecontest;hemayalsostillbetryingtosolve
one of the other problems. The former would indicate a ``drop out'' effect, while the latter would not. As shown
in Table 7, we do not observe such an effect; an increase in the number of superstars or non-superstars does not
signi icantly affect whether competitors open the third problem.
The amount of time spent working on the third problem (for coders who have opened this problem) provides
a second indicator of effort. Signi icantly less time spent on the third problem may indicate that a competitor has
droppedout; itcouldalsoindicategreaterrisktaking,asnotedearlier. However,asshowninthesecondandthird
columns of Table 7, time spent working on submissions either does not change signi icantly or increases as the
number of superstars and non-superstars increases.
Lastly, recall that each contest ends with a 15 minute challenge phase, in which coders can examine whether
thesubmissionsofothercoderscontainlogical laws. Ifcodersdropoutofthecontest, wewouldnotexpectthem
to participate in the challenge phase. Hence, the likelihood that a competitor issues a challenge should fall among
the group most likely to drop out, namely, those who open the third problem but do not submit a solution. If
coders in this group drop out, we would expect to see a negative effect of increased competition on the likelihood
of issuing a challenge. As shown in Table 9, for coders in this group, the estimates show essentially no change in
thelikelihoodofissuingachallengeinthefaceofalargernumberofnon-superstars. Thesameholdsforcodersin
the PDZ in the face of a larger number of superstars.19 The only change in behavior comes from coders above the
PDZ,whoincreaseratherthandecreasechallengeswhenfacedwithadditionalsuperstars, consistentwithearlier
results showing that the  inal points for these coders increase in the presence of a greater number of superstars.
[Table 9 about here.]
Insummary,theseresultsprovidenoevidencethatcodersreducetheireffortasthenumberofnon-superstars
or superstars increases. Coders are no less likely to open the third problem, do not spend less time working on it,
and are not less likely to issue a challenge in response to increased competition.
7.4 Cognitive Changes
Although we  ind no evidence that coders reduce observable effort in response to increased competition, points
earned in a contest also depend on the correctness of submissions independent of effort. As noted earlier, errors
19The interaction terms shown in Table 9 are also interacted with a dummy variable for having opened but not submitted a solution to the third
problem.
17inacceptedsubmissionsindicatelogical lawsinsubmittedcode, whicharelikelytoderivefromcognitivefactors.
In order to investigate the possibility that cognitive factors explain the performance outcomes that we observe,
we examine whether increased competition affects the likelihood of an incorrect submission for the third prob-
lem (conditional on submitting). We control for time spent working on submissions, because greater time spent
working may reduce errors.
As shown in Table 10, the results indicate that near-to-the-top competitors in the PDZ are signi icantly more
likely to produce faulty code as the number of non-superstars and superstars increases.20 For the same amount
of time spent working, these coders make about 1.5 percent more incorrect submissions for each additional non-
superstar in the room. These coders also make about 4 percent more incorrect submissions for each additional
superstar in the room. Hence, even when controlling for observable effort in terms of the amount of time that
coders work on solutions, coders in the PDZ make more logical errors as competition increases.21 Here again, we
 ind evidence that coders react far more strongly to increased competition from superstars than from non-super-
stars. Inaddition,we indnoevidencethatcodersabovethePDZmakemorelogicalerrorsinthefaceofincreased
competition from non-superstars or superstars.
[Table 10 about here.]
Taken together, the evidence suggests that near-to-the-top competitors in the PDZ do not reduce their observ-
able effort but make more logical mistakes. As noted earlier, a variety of cognitive factors could explain these
results. For example, these mistakes could stem from a reduction in cognitive effort. That is, the brain may get
tired even as coders continue to work on problems. In an experimental study, Bracha and Fershtman (2012)  ind
that some people may work harder but not smarter under tournament conditions.
As an alternative or possibly complementary explanation, psychological pressure from increased competition
may lead to choking that in turns leads to more mistakes. Choking occurs even when incentives for superior per-
formance are high (Baumeister and Showers, 1986). For example, individuals have been found to choke when
faced with high  inancial incentives and competitive stakes (Ariely et al., 2009; Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta,
2010). In a review of a large amount of evidence in psychology, DeCaro et al. (2011) note that two separate mech-
anisms cause choking. First, self-consciousness about performing correctly leads to increased attention on the
precise steps in learning and executing skills. This in turn disrupts ``procedural'' skill execution that takes place
without conscious awareness, commonly seen in sports activities like golf putting, hockey dribbling, and baseball
batting. Secondly, distraction caused by undue focus on performing well reduces the amount of working memory
available, as in mathematical puzzle-solving (Beilock and Carr, 2001, 2005). In the contests examined here, pres-
sure to perform well could disrupt coders' routine (procedural) approaches to algorithmic problem solving, and
a reduction in working memory could affect the ability to solve attention-demanding algorithmic problems.
In contrast to near-to-the-top competitors in the PDZ, coders above the PDZ do not make more logical errors,
andtheyexertgreatereffortbymakingmorechallengeswhenfacedwithincreasednumbersofsuperstars. These
competitors, who have predicted ranks just below superstars, do not appear to suffer from cognitive deteriora-
tion in problem solving. As noted earlier, for these competitors, self-con idence stemming from high ability may
counterbalance any negative impact of pressure to perform well. In addition, the increase in observable effort in
the face of additional superstars is consistent with the argument that those on the edge of winning positions have
an incentive to exert maximum effort (Casas-Arce and Martı́nez-Jerez, 2009).
8 Summary and Conclusions
Thisstudybeganwiththeobservationthatpriorresearchhasfoundthatindividualsintournament-stylecontests
perform less well in the face of increased competition, but that studies often lack evidence about the mechanisms
that underlie this result, especially in  ield settings. We provide evidence regarding three mechanisms that may
20The interaction terms shown in Table 10 are also interacted with a dummy variable for having submitted a solution to the third problem.
21Note that the reported coef icients on the time spent working in Table 10 may be biased. It is possible that time spent working and incorrect
submissions are both in luenced by an unobserved cognitive variable. However, the coef icients on the competition measures will still be estimated
consistently.
18account for such a performance decline: reduction in effort, increased risk taking, and deterioration in cognitive
processing.
Inthe algorithmicprogrammingcontestsstudiedhere, we indthat thelargestnegativereactionstoincreased
competition come from a group of competitors who are near-to-the-top in terms of ability. In contrast to the pre-
dictionsoftournamenttheory,we indnoevidencethatcompetitorsinthisgroupreducetheireffortinreactionto
increased competition. For example, time spent working on problems, a particularly relevant measure of effort in
these contests, does not decrease as the number of competitors increases. We also  ind no evidence of increased
risk taking. Instead, the evidence shows that competitors in this group make more logical errors when faced with
increased competition, especially from superstars, suggesting that cognitive factors at least partly account for the
decline in performance. We also  ind that a small group of very high ability competitors (excluding superstars)
reactspositivelytoincreasedcompetitionfromsuperstars. Thesecompetitorsexertsomewhatgreatereffortdur-
ing contests, consistent with economic logic that competitors on the edge of winning may exert maximum effort,
andcognitiveerrorsdonotincrease,consistentwithpsychologicalresearchsuggestingthatveryhighabilitycom-
petitors may not succumb to performance pressure.
In addition to providing evidence on the mechanisms that underpin changes in performance in reaction to
increased competition, this study extends prior research in a number of ways. First, the structure of TopCoder
contests enables us to go beyond prior empirical research on the N-effect, by distinguishing between increased
competition from superstars and non-superstars. We  ind that an additional superstar has a much more neg-
ative effect on the performance of the average competitor than an additional non-superstar. This  inding also
contributestoempiricalresearchonthesuperstareffect,whichhasfocusedheavilyonsportingevents,byprovid-
ing evidence from non-sports contests that increased competition from superstars negatively affects the average
performance of non-superstars.
Our study also shows that the ability of competitors affects their reactions to increased competition. Prior re-
search in both economics and psychology suggests that more highly skilled competitors may have the strongest
reactions. We  ind that this holds in online algorithm contests. Although lower ability competitors have a signif-
icant (and negative) reaction to increased competition, most of the reaction comes from high ability competitors
(excluding superstars). Our results show that these high ability competitors react negatively to an increase in
non-superstars. This is not surprising, given that non-superstars include some competitors of high ability, who
therefore may cause the rank of a high ability competitor to decline. In addition, like lower ability competitors,
thesehighabilitycodersreactmorestronglytoincreasedcompetitionfromsuperstarsthanfromnon-superstars.
However, as noted above, the high ability coders differ in their reactions to superstars. Most react negatively,
but a small group of competitors, who are just below superstars in their abilities, have a positive reaction. Al-
though Brown (2011) does not  ind a positive reaction of highly skilled players to the superstar Tiger Woods in
PGA tournaments, Connolly and Rendleman Jr. (2009)  ind that high ability players paired with Woods perform
better when both are in contention to win a tournament than when they are not. These mixed  indings regarding
such next-to-the-top competitors suggest that future research is warranted.
Although very high ability coders react positively to increased competition from superstars in the algorithm
contests, most competitors react negatively to an increase in both superstars and non-superstars. Strikingly,
coders who account for the largest portion of this negative reaction do not reduce observable ``labor'' effort. In-
stead, we  ind that these coders make more logical errors when faced with increased competition. Bracha and
Fershtman(2012)provideexperimentalevidenceintournamentsthatsuggeststhatreducedcognitiveeffortmay
playarole. Inaddition,althoughpsychologyresearchhasnotexaminedchokingintournaments,newexperimen-
tal evidence suggests that choking may be especially relevant in this setting. This evidence comes from DeCaro
et al. (2011), who show that the makeup of the pressure situation affects which of the choking mechanisms (dis-
ruptionofproceduralskillexecutionorareductioninworkingmemorycausedbydistraction)comesintoplay. In
particular, pressure from being watched, termed ``monitoring pressure'', leads to disruption of procedural learn-
ingandskillexecution.22 Incontrast,pressuretoearnarewardifacertainoutcomeisachieved,termed``outcome
pressure'', leads to distraction from the task at hand. Many tournaments contain both types of pressure. Partici-
22DeCaro et al. (2011) mention the presence of a mirror or a video camera as creating monitoring pressure from being watched, in addition to
watching by other individuals. Thus, being watched in any way results in monitoring pressure.
19pants watch and are watched by other participants, which could disrupt participants' procedural skill execution.
Inaddition,almostbyde inition,tournamentscontainrewardsforperformingwell(evenifsimplyrankinghighly),
which could distract participants from devoting full attention to the task at hand.
More generally, a better understanding of behavioral responses in contestscan aid both public policy and con-
test designers. The use of contests to elicit creative effort and technological innovation has gained renewed inter-
estinboththepublicandprivatesectors(TapscottandWilliams,2006;NationalResearchCouncil,2007;McKinsey
& Company, 2009; Zients, 2010). With further work to understand what triggers performance losses, contest de-
signersmaybeabletoavoidgeneratingnuisanceeffectsinthecontestenvironmentsuchaschoking. Whiledevel-
opingaresiliencetochokingmaybebene icialforathleteswhosejobsentailparticipatingincompetitivesporting
events, such resilience is unlikely to be critical for software development, scienti ic research, and creative skills
now sought in online contests. This suggests that sponsors of such contests face the challenge of  inding ways to
reduce the negative effects of cognitive factors so that contests can better measure ability and provide incentives
for performance.
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Appendices
A The TopCoder Rating System
Here we describe the main elements of the TopCoder rating system. The rating system is described in greater
detail at: HTTP://WWW.TOPCODER.COM/WIKI/DISPLAY/TC/ALGORITHM+COMPETITION+RATING+SYSTEM. The
formula for a coder's rating is:
NewRating =
OldRating + Weight ⋅ PerfAs
1 + Weight
Acoder'sratingisupdatedattheendofeachcontesttoproduceNewRating.23 OldRatingisthecoder'spre-contest
rating. If a coder has never competed in a TopCoder algorithm contest, TopCoder assigns a value of 1200 to Ol-
dRating.
Rearranging terms, based on the formula for PerfAs below, yields:
NewRating = OldRating +  
Weight
1 + Weight
  ⋅ CF ⋅ (APerf − EPerf)
PerfAs is the provisional rating assigned to each coder at the end of a contest.
PerfAs = OldRating + CF ⋅ (APerf − EPerf)
23On the TopCoder website, in the explanation of the rating system, the variable Rating is sometimes used in place of what we term OldRating. We
use NewRating and OldRating for clarity.
22APerf is the coder's rank order performance in the contest, calculated as a value in an inverse standard normal
distribution that adjusts for the number of coders per contest:
APerf = −Φ 
ARank − 0.5
NumCoders
 
where ARank is the coder's rank in a contest, based on total points per coder and NumCoders is the number of
coders in the contest.
EPerfisthepredictedvalueofAPerf, basedonthecoder'spre-contestratingrelativetothepre-contestratings
of other contestants:
EPerf = −Φ 
ERank − 0.5
NumCoders
 
where ERank = 0.5 + ∑  𝑊𝑃 . 𝑊𝑃 , or Win Probability, is the probability that the coder will have a higher score
than another coder 𝑖 in the contest. Each Win Probability is calculated based on the pre-contest ratings of coders
thatenteredthecontest,adjustedforameasureofthespreadofeachcoder'spriorcontestratings,termedVolatil-
ity. Coders that have never competed before receive an initial value of 300 for Volatility.
In the formula for PerfAs, CF denotes a ``Competition Factor'' for each contest. CF captures the spread of the
pre-contestratingsofcodersinthecontest,basedonbothpre-contestVolatilitiesofthecontestantsandameasure
of the difference between the average pre-contest rating of contestants and individual coder pre-contest ratings.
A greater spread of pre-contest ratings results in a higher competition factor, leading to a higher weight on the
difference between a coder's actual and anticipated performance. Intuitively, changes in rank order performance
in a contest where coders have similar abilities, as measured by pre-contest ratings, are more likely to re lect
random factors rather than skill, and therefore receive lower weight in calculating the new rating. Finally, in the
formula for NewRating, Weight for each coder is an inverse function of the number of times that the coder has
beenratedpreviously. Moreexperiencedcodershavelessweightattachedtothedifferencebetweentheircurrent
rank order performance, APerf, and their predicted rank order performance as re lected in EPerf. In addition, a
coder's NewRating cannot exceed his or her OldRating by more than a set value termed Cap, which is an inverse
function of the number of times that a coder has been rated. The values of Weight and Cap insure that the ratings
of more experienced coders change less over time than do the ratings of less experienced coders.
B Large Tables
[Table 11 about here.]
[Table 12 about here.]
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24Figure 2: Illustration of how competitive proximity is de ined.
(a) Competitors are ordered by predicted score.
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(d) Two competitors whose prediction intervals are connected by any number of intervening intervals are considered
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Figure 3: Illustration of the identi ication of superstar competitors.
(a) Scores predicted from previous years' performance.
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(b) ±  std. dev. prediction intervals from previous years' performance.
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25Figure 4: Number of Superstars in competition rooms.
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Figure 5: Number of groups in competition rooms.
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26Figure 6: Response to competition across TopCoder ratings using a locally-weighted, kernel approach.
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27Figure 7: Response to competition for the three contest problems and challenge phase using kernel techniques.
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28Figure 8: Response to competition on third problem: points, correctness, and time worked, using kernel tech-
niques.
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29Tables
Table 1: The response of  inal points to number of com-
petitors in the room.
Covariates Final Points
Number in Room −2.593
⋆⋆⋆
(0.975)
TopCoder Rating 0.0731
⋆⋆⋆
(0.00675)
1   Problem Point Value −0.724
⋆⋆⋆
(0.0525)
2   Problem Point Value −0.495
⋆⋆⋆
(0.0284)
3   Problem Point Value −0.146
⋆⋆⋆
(0.0215)
Number in Contest 0.0245
(0.0236)
Was Money Paid 10.54
⋆⋆⋆
(2.698)
Contest Year −5.843
⋆
(3.229)
Constant 208.2
⋆⋆⋆
(11.16)
Month Dummies Yes
Day of Week Dummies Yes
Observations 50,130
Number of Competitors 4,432
Competitor Fixed-effects, Standard errors in parentheses,
⋆⋆⋆      .  , ⋆⋆      .  , ⋆      . 
Table 2: The response of  inal points to the number of
superstars and number of competitors in the room.
Covariates Final Points
Number in Room −2.606
⋆⋆⋆
(0.974)
Number of Superstars −2.670
⋆⋆⋆
(0.845)
TC Rating 0.0727
⋆⋆⋆
(0.00675)
1   Problem Point Value −0.724
⋆⋆⋆
(0.0524)
2   Problem Point Value −0.497
⋆⋆⋆
(0.0284)
3   Problem Point Value −0.147
⋆⋆⋆
(0.0215)
Number in Contest 0.022
(0.0236)
Was Money Paid 10.76
⋆⋆⋆
(2.698)
Contest Year −5.641
⋆
(3.23)
Constant 208.0
⋆⋆⋆
(11.16)
Month Dummies Yes
Day of Week Dummies Yes
Observations 50,130
Number of Competitors 4,432
Competitor Fixed-effects, Standard errors in parentheses,
⋆⋆⋆      .  , ⋆⋆      .  , ⋆      . 
30Table 3: The response of  inal points to the number of
superstars and non-superstars in the room.
Covariates Final Points
Number of Non-Superstars −2.606
⋆⋆⋆
(0.974)
Number of Superstars −5.277
⋆⋆⋆
(1.293)
TC Rating 0.0727
⋆⋆⋆
(0.00675)
1st Problem Point Value −0.724
⋆⋆⋆
(0.0524)
2nd Problem Point Value −0.497
⋆⋆⋆
(0.0284)
3rd Problem Point Value −0.147
⋆⋆⋆
(0.0215)
Number in Contest 0.0220
(0.0236)
Was Money Paid 10.76
⋆⋆⋆
(2.698)
Contest Year −5.641
⋆
(3.230)
Constant 207.6
⋆⋆⋆
(11.14)
Month Dummies Yes
Day of Week Dummies Yes
Observations 50,139
Number of Competitors 4,432
Competitor Fixed-effects, Standard errors in parentheses,
⋆⋆⋆      .  , ⋆⋆      .  , ⋆      . 
31Table 4: Response to competition for the three contest problems and challenge phase.
Covariates Final Points 1   Problem 2   Problem 3   Problem Challenge
Points Points Points Points
Below PDZ × Number of Non-Superstars −1.930
⋆ −0.760
⋆ −2.084
⋆⋆⋆ 0.473 0.376
⋆⋆
(1.031) (0.427) (0.629) (0.603) (0.177)
PDZ × Number of Non-Superstars −7.608
⋆⋆ -1.194 -1.296 −5.141
⋆⋆⋆ 0.111
(3.144) (1.302) (1.918) (1.84) (0.54)
Above PDZ × Number of Non-Superstars -9.775 -2.131 -2.743 −7.713
⋆⋆ 2.822
⋆⋆
(6.447) (2.669) (3.932) (3.772) (1.107)
Below PDZ × Number of Superstars −4.388
⋆⋆⋆ −1.442
⋆⋆⋆ −2.764
⋆⋆⋆ -0.127 -0.0866
(1.347) (0.558) (0.822) (0.788) (0.231)
PDZ × Number of Superstars −19.83
⋆⋆⋆ -0.273 -3.376 −15.97
⋆⋆⋆ 0.0542
(5.615) (2.324) (3.425) (3.285) (0.964)
Above PDZ × Number of Superstars 31.00
⋆ -3.274 3.73 31.98
⋆⋆⋆ -1.385
(16.57) (6.86) (10.11) (9.695) (2.845)
Constant 203.8
⋆⋆⋆ 168.6
⋆⋆⋆ 52.86
⋆⋆⋆ −18.75
⋆⋆⋆ 0.9
(11.17) (4.623) (6.812) (6.533) (1.917)
Includes: PDZ Indicators (Below Omitted), Skill Control, and Contest Controls;
Observations: 50,139; Number of competitors: 4,432; Competitor Fixed-effects, Standard errors in parentheses,
⋆⋆⋆      .  , ⋆⋆      .  , ⋆      . 
Table 5: Response to competition for points on the third problem, with varying controls and speci ications.
Covariates OLS OLS Primary Contest FE Competitor FE
No Controls Speci ication Experience
Below PDZ × Number of Non-Superstars -0.198 0.767 0.473 1.323
⋆⋆ 0.497
(0.568) (0.568) (0.603) (0.585) (0.603)
PDZ × Number of Non-Superstars −5.843
⋆⋆⋆ −4.870
⋆⋆⋆ −5.141
⋆⋆⋆ −4.281
⋆⋆ −5.153
⋆⋆⋆
(1.825) (1.795) (1.84) (1.74) (1.839)
Above PDZ × Number of Non-Superstars −7.157
⋆ −6.671
⋆ −7.713
⋆⋆ −8.324
⋆⋆ −7.654
⋆⋆
(3.719) (3.649) (3.772) (3.514) (3.771)
Below PDZ × Number of Superstars -1.153 0.137 -0.127 1.122 -0.0935
(0.746) (0.739) (0.788) (0.745) (0.788)
PDZ × Number of Superstars −18.94
⋆⋆⋆ −16.40
⋆⋆⋆ −15.97
⋆⋆⋆ −15.50
⋆⋆⋆ −16.06
⋆⋆⋆
(3.257) (3.196) (3.285) (3.085) (3.285)
Above PDZ × Number of Superstars 24.64
⋆⋆⋆ 28.66
⋆⋆⋆ 31.98
⋆⋆⋆ 18.32
⋆⋆ 32.08
⋆⋆⋆
(9.544) (9.357) (9.695) (9.011) (9.694)
Constant 18.15
⋆⋆⋆ −11.92
⋆ −18.75
⋆⋆⋆ 28.60
⋆⋆⋆ −23.80
⋆⋆⋆
(0.678) (6.176) (6.533) (0.736) (6.675)
Skill Control No No Yes Yes Yes
Contest Controls No No Yes No Yes
Competitor Fixed-Effects No Yes Yes No Yes
Experience Control No No No No Yes
Contest Fixed-Effects No No No Yes No
Includes: PDZ Indicators (Below Omitted), Skill Control, and Contest Controls;
Observations: 50,139; Number of competitors: 4,432;
Competitor Fixed-effects, Standard errors in parentheses, ⋆⋆⋆      .  , ⋆⋆      .  , ⋆      . 
32Table 6: Response to competition with restricted numbers of superstars.
Covariates All Rooms Rooms with Rooms with
< 3 Superstars < 4 Superstars
Below PDZ × Number of Non-Superstars 0.473 0.0743 0.1
(0.433) (0.514) (0.398)
PDZ × Number of Non-Superstars −5.141
⋆⋆⋆ −3.956
⋆ 0.631
(0.0052) (0.0709) (0.811)
Above PDZ × Number of Non-Superstars −7.713
⋆⋆ 11.59
⋆⋆ 11.14
(0.0409) (0.0339) (0.22)
Below PDZ × Number of Superstars -0.127 -0.0348 -0.135
(0.872) (0.975) (0.876)
PDZ × Number of Superstars −15.97
⋆⋆⋆ −28.98
⋆⋆⋆ −22.31
⋆⋆⋆
(1.16E-06) (2.14E-08) (3.65E-06)
Above PDZ × Number of Superstars 31.98
⋆⋆⋆ 73.71
⋆⋆⋆ 42.75
⋆⋆
(0.000974) (-4.17E-08) (0.0116)
Constant −26.75
⋆⋆ −18.46
⋆⋆⋆ −18.18
⋆⋆⋆
(0.0416) (0.00558) (0.00656)
Includes: PDZ Indicators (Below Omitted), Skill Control, and Contest Controls;
Observations: 50,139; Number of competitors: 4,432;
Competitor Fixed-effects, Standard errors in parentheses, ⋆⋆⋆      .  , ⋆⋆      .  , ⋆      . 
Table 7: Response to competition on third problem: likelihood of opening the problem and time spent working.
Covariates 3   Not Opened Min. Worked
on 3   Submissions
Min. Worked
on Correct 3   Submissions
PDZ × Number of Non-Superstars -0.00108 0.643
⋆⋆ 0.385
(0.00554) (0.322) (0.435)
Above PDZ × Number of Non-Superstars 0.00391 0.153 -0.0693
(0.0114) (0.519) (0.658)
PDZ × Number of Superstars -0.0105 0.969 1.344
⋆
(0.00989) (0.598) (0.809)
Above PDZ × Number of Superstars 0.00357 -0.0948 -0.00679
(0.0292) (1.247) (1.572)
Constant 0.297
⋆⋆⋆ 33.37
⋆⋆⋆ 33.34
⋆⋆⋆
(0.0196) (2.103) (2.088)
Includes: PDZ Indicators (Below Omitted), Skill Control, and Contest Controls;
Observations: 50,139 (column 1), 6,174 (columns 2 & 3);
Number of competitors: 4,432 (column 1), 1,461 (columns 2 & 3);
Competitor Fixed-effects, Standard errors in parentheses, ⋆⋆⋆      .  , ⋆⋆      .  , ⋆      . 
33Table 8: Response to competition on third problem:
likelihood of errors in submissions.
Covariates
3rd Incorrect
cond. on
submitting
PDZ × Number of Non-Superstars 0.0209
⋆⋆⋆
(0.00487)
Above PDZ × Number of Non-Superstars 0.0116
(0.00792)
PDZ × Number of Superstars 0.0495
⋆⋆⋆
(0.00903)
Above PDZ × Number of Superstars -0.0118
(0.0192)
Constant 1.039
⋆⋆⋆
(0.00995)
Includes: PDZ Indicators (Below Omitted),
Skill Control, and Contest Controls;
Observations: 50,139; Number of competitors: 4,432;
Competitor Fixed-effects, Standard errors in parentheses,
⋆⋆⋆      .  , ⋆⋆      .  , ⋆      . 
Table 9: Likelihood of competitors, who opened but did
not submit the third problem issuing a challenge.
Covariates Issued
Challenge
PDZ × Number of Non-Superstars -0.0116
(0.0255)
Above PDZ × Number of Non-Superstars -0.0523
(0.0962)
PDZ × Number of Superstars 0.0627
(0.0545)
Above PDZ × Number of Superstars 0.542
⋆
(0.323)
Constant 0.279
⋆⋆⋆
(0.0217)
Includes: PDZ Indicators (Below Omitted),
Skill Control, and Contest Controls;
Observations: 50,139; Number of competitors: 4,432;
Competitor Fixed-effects, Standard errors in parentheses,
⋆⋆⋆      .  , ⋆⋆      .  , ⋆      . 
Table 10: Likelihood of incorrect submissions for the
third problem controlling for minutes spent working.
Covariates
3rd Incorrect
cond. on
submitting
PDZ × Number of Non-Superstars 0.0149
⋆⋆⋆
(0.00486)
Above PDZ × Number of Non-Superstars 0.00930
(0.00788)
PDZ × Number of Superstars 0.0408
⋆⋆⋆
(0.00900)
Above PDZ × Number of Superstars -0.0162
(0.0191)
PDZ × Min. Spent Working 0.00709
⋆⋆⋆
(0.000399)
Above PDZ × Min. Spent Working 0.00662
(0.000593)
Constant 1.037
⋆⋆⋆
(0.00990)
Includes: PDZ Indicators (Below Omitted),
Skill Control, and Contest Controls;
Observations: 50,139; Number of competitors: 4,432;
Competitor Fixed-effects, Standard errors in parentheses,
⋆⋆⋆      .  , ⋆⋆      .  , ⋆      . 
34Table 11: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
TopCoder Rating 1603.82 329.24 1200 3375
Number of Contests (prior experience) 35.63 35.91 1 273
Final Points in Contest 246.81 256.67 -400 1972.53
Final Points on     Problem⋆ 129.28 99.1 0 308
Final Points on     Problem⋆ 84.44 145.84 0 643
Final Points on     Problem⋆ 29.99 132.93 0 990
Final Points on     Problem (cond. on submitting) 142.42 94.6 0 308
Final Points on     Problem (cond. on submitting) 162.76 168.08 0 643
Final Points on     Problem (cond. on submitting) 243.58 302.48 0 990
Challenge Points 2.86 37.56 -500 700
Minutes Worked on     Problem 3.92 11.46 0 74.88
    Problem Incorrect⋆ 0.95 0.22 0 1
Minutes Worked on     Problem (cond. on submitting) 31.83 13.31 0.15 74.88
    Problem Incorrect (cond. on submitting) 0.58 0.49 0 1
Number of Competitors in Contest 352.1 127.82 113 619
Number of Competitors in Room 18.61 1.06 13 20
Total Points Available in Contest⋆⋆ 1753.89 53.98 1550 1950
Point Value of First Problem 256.63 20.98 200 375
Point Value of Second Problem 511.61 41.39 400 675
Point Value of Third Problem 985.65 51.67 750 1200
Number of Superstars per room 1.31 1.21 0 16
Number of Non-superstars per room 17.3 1.61 2 20
Number of Groups in room 2.93 1.36 1 9
Dollars Paid Out in Prizes 1323.4 2205.9 0 5032
Number of Rooms per Contest 16.2 6.65 7 34
Number of Blue Coders per Room 8.17 3.23 0 20
Number of Yellow Coders per Room 8.34 2.52 0 16
Number of Red Coders per Room 2.1 1.8 0 9
Number of Below PDZ Coders per Room 15.46 2.53 7 20
Number of PDZ Coders per Room 1.99 1.57 0 8
Number of Above PDZ Coders per Room 1.15 1.28 0 8
⋆ Includes coders who did not make submissions and therefore earned 0 points
⋆⋆ Calculated as the sum of the point values for the three problems, exclusive of challenge points
35Table 12: Response to competition using dummy vari-
ables to indicate number of superstars.
Covariates Final Points
Below PDZ × Number of Non-Superstars -1.46
(0.981)
PDZ × Number of Non-Superstars −7.521
⋆⋆
(3.14)
Above PDZ × Number of Non-Superstars -9.351
(6.444)
Below PDZ × 1 Superstar −7.420
⋆⋆
(3.344)
Below PDZ × 2 Superstars −8.237
⋆
(4.471)
Below PDZ × 3 Superstars -9.513
(6.22)
Below PDZ × 4 Superstars −16.40
⋆
(8.421)
Below PDZ × 5+ Superstars −30.30
⋆⋆⋆
(9.43)
PDZ × 1 Superstar -1.599
(12.73)
PDZ × 2 Superstars −54.62
⋆⋆⋆
(15.74)
PDZ × 3 Superstars −61.91
⋆⋆⋆
(23.43)
PDZ × 4 Superstars 26.22
(38.08)
PDZ × 5+ Superstars -38.97
(55.47)
Above PDZ × 1 Superstar 15.9
(45.02)
Above PDZ × 2 Superstars 71.68
(49.4)
Above PDZ × 3 Superstars -3.218
(73.09)
Above PDZ × 4 Superstars No Obs.
-
Above PDZ × 5+ Superstars No Obs.
-
Constant 232.7
⋆⋆⋆
(11.7)
Includes: PDZ Indicators (Below Omitted),
Skill Control, and Contest Controls;
Observations: 50,139; Number of competitors: 4,432;
Competitor Fixed-effects, Standard errors in parentheses,
⋆⋆⋆      .  , ⋆⋆      .  , ⋆      . 
36